

## IV. On Republic X, 595a—608b10

## A. Argumentation Its Structure of Argumentation

The passage in *Republic*<sub>2</sub> Book X<sub>2</sub> starting from 595a and ending at 608b10<sub>3</sub> can be divided into two distinct discussions. The first, at 595a—602b, provides the a characterizeration of the imitator figure, as well as and an argument about who in the city is toshould be considered an imitator. The second at 602c—608b addresses the psychology of imitation, it provides arguments for why and explains why the avoidance of imitation is tomust be avoided is necessary.

## 1. Definition of Imitation; A-and are aAll tragic proets Imitators?

Book X begins with Socrates boasting that the banishment of imitative art

from their city of imitative art, that was established in Book III, was a wise decision. But However, from the distinctly different uses of "imitation" in Book III, create it is confusion abouting what has been banned: the first, stylistic usage means that all literature containing more than a small amount of first-person narration should be excluded from the city, while the second, substantive usage would ban poets who had the content of whose worksthat was lackeding in philosophical grounding in its content (cf. Section III). Fortunately, Socrates immediately tries to clarify his usage of "imitation," and he begins by comparing the products of different trades. The craftsman (ho demiourgos) makes an imitation of the idea of a product (596b6—11); producing items resembling but his products that do not have having actual being, but only a resemblance to it (597a5—12). In contrast, Socrates defines the imitator (hē mimētē) as one who imitates merely the appearances which that theof a craftsman's produces product. The idea itself is the product of the god (597d1—8), and the craftsman is at a second twice- removed

Commented [CP1]: I changed this to US English as requested. I also changed single quotation marks to double ones and deleted spacing around dashes to align with US English conventions.

Commented [CP2]: You may wish to consider replacing "craftsman" with "artisan" throughout to remove gender bias. However, it is also important for readers to be able to match your discussion with a familiar version of the text, so I thought it best to leave the decision to you.

Commented [CP3]: This could be changed to "an idea or template" to help the reader understand how "idea" is being used here. Alternatively, you could simply use "an idea" if your readers are already familiar with this concept of ideas. The words "the idea" implied that a particular idea shaping the artisan's work had already been mentioned.

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from the idea in by imitating its reality (596b6—11), ); so therefore, the imitator is at a thirdthrice removed from Truth in copying only the appearance of the craftsman's product (587e1—5).

With this definition having been accomplished in place, Socrates moves on to know then questions of what type of person might be considered an imitator. It is decided that the art of painting is determined to be always determined directed to imitating imitate appearance only, and never reality (598b3—\_7). Socrates thus easily labels categorizes all painters (hoi zōgraphoi) as imitators. At 597e6—\_8, Socrates states that this label of "imitator?" "will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes\_... from the \_\_\_\_ truth...?" (HC 822\_\_3). Here, the Greek conditional eiper begins the conditional clause.

Smyth (538—\_9) writes that this strong conditional is used "especially when the truth of a statement is implicitly denied or doubted.?" This distinction may or may not be significant, given the extensive attention given paid to tragic poets later in this Book X passage, but it is worth noting.

Socrates creates a test to determine whether or not tragic poets deserve to be placed in the group of banished imitators. At 599b2—\_7, Socrates says that, "if, in truth, he had knowledge concerning the things that he imitates, he would greatly prefer to pursue these things zealously in his works, rather than to pursue counterfeits and copies." (my translation). Correctly If you want to uUunderstanding this correctly, requires reading it must be read with considering the ontology developed in Books V-through \_VII in mind. Plato establishes that the real things, capable of being known, are not spatio-temporal (cf. the sun analogy in Book VI [HC 742—\_4], the Cave cave analogy in Book VII [HC 749—\_52], and the argument that the highest function of the soul is intellection [(HC 747]). Because of this Therefore, it would be completely incoherent for

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Plato to maintain in this passage that the ultimate test of the soundness of one's ontological beliefs must be is the tangible properties of one's work. The discussion about the popular perceptions of philosophers in Book VI should be kept in mindconsidered. Here, Plato defends the philosophers against the accusation that they appears to be worthless because their work doesn't does not seem to command respect. Plato retorts by maintaining that the one who has wisdom will gladly share it with others upon their request, but that it is neither the philosopher's responsibility nor thise desire of philosophers to hunt down those ignorant of theis wisdom and to attempt to convince his unwilling audiences to listen to thiem. So Thus, in this Republic X passage, it is not unlikely that Plato has suddenly shifted position and now demands popular recognition or tangible accomplishments as proof of his wisdom. ("... and [he] would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser.—" [599b5—\_7]). Yet, Socrates next applies judges the tragic poets next by using this possibly unsound method standard to tragic poets. He reports that no legislators use the writings of Homer to create their laws (599d—\_e), nor have any cults formed that base their beliefs upon these writings (600a8—\_b6). Socrates asks whether, that "if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them?<sup>2</sup> The discussion of concerning philosophers in Book VI is once again relevant. Here, Socrates asserts that popular opinion seems inevitably to inevitably hold lovers of wisdom in no esteem. "Teach this [lesson] to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honored <u>""</u> (489a10—\_b2). As <u>in-with</u> the previous <del>part of this</del> argument,

**Commented [CP7]:** I rephrased this slightly to avoid gender bias. Additional changes below have the same purpose.

Commented [CP8]: Since Socrates is known for using irony at times, it may be worth explaining why you think this inconsistency is not a ruse but truly goes unnoticed by both Socrates and Plato. it's completely unfounded there is no basis forto believinge that Plato has changed his criteria for the judgment recognition of recognizing wisdom since Book VI.

In the text of the Book X argument, however, Socrates *does* rail against Homer and the tragic poets for their lack of popularity and influence (599c2—600e4). His He conclusion concludes is that all poets are merely imitators of images of the things they subjects of their write writing about and that they have no grasp onf Truth (600e4—7; 602b8—10)<sup>4</sup>.

This argument for labeling all poets as imitators is a failure fails because, as previously noted, Plato clearly (and rightly) does not endorse the premise at 599b8—\_600e4, e.g., namely, that the wise man person will necessarily be definitely prosperous and honored. But, Nevertheless, the premise at 599a8—b6 should be noticed noted. Depending upon the Onla some translations accepted, Plato's intention here can be is consistent with ideas presented elsewhere in the *Republic*. According to Shorey's and Grube's translations, Socrates posits that if a man-people withhas real knowledge, he will spend theisr time employing that knowledge in deeds (e.g., physical actions) instead of in imitations (e.g., in writing about men's others' actions, as a poet does). My translation differs: if one has the works of people who have knowledgeknowledgeable about real things, his works must be informed by these real things, instead rather than of by imitations. By OnIn my interpretation, these deeds or works don't need not have to be physical actions. In accordance with the Socratic teaching that knowledge is commanding, I believe that Plato here does agrees that, if one who has with knowledge of the objects of reality, he will always imitate these things rather than their appearances. Whether one chooses to express this knowledge of reality by writing literature or by performing valiant deeds will simply be a matter of personal aptitude and preference.

While the second half of the argument contained in Book X<sub>2</sub> 595a—\_602b<sub>3</sub> generally fails overall to convince us that all poets really are imitators by Plato's definition, the first half is valuable for it's definition of imitation, which This definition will be used in the second argument presented in Book X's first half, concerning which concerns the deleterious bad effects of imitation upon the soul (602c—\_608b).

**Commented [CP9]:** This was changed to match the tone of the surrounding sentence.

## References:

Plato. Republic. Trans. GMA Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1992. Smyth HW. Greek Grammar, revised edition. Martino Fine Books, 2013.